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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
JEFFERY RAY CHATWIN,

CaseNo.20010060-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION
This is an appeal from a conviction for Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony,
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999), in the Third Judicial District Court,
State of Utah, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, Judge, presiding.1
Jurisdiction is conferred upon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a3(2)(e) (Supp. 2001), which grants this Court jurisdiction over appeals from convictions
for any crime other than a first degree or capital felony.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE. STANDARD OF REVIEW. AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT
Issue: Did the trial court err by allowing the prosecutor to perempt Mr. Amador Romero
["Mr. Romero"], the only member of a racial minority on the venire, after the prosecutor

1

A copy of the Minutes of the "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" is attached in
Addendum A.

explained that the sole reason for Mr. Romero's dismissal was his gender?
Standard of Review: "The trial court's conclusion as to whether or not a prima facie
case [of racial or sexual discrimination] was established is a legal determination which
we review for correctness, according it no particular deference."2 Any "factual findings
of the trial court relevant to allegedly discriminatory peremptory challenges merit
deference on appeal and will be set aside only if they are clearly erroneous." Pharos, 846
P.2d at 459. Ultimately, the trial court's decision about whether purposeful
discrimination was proved "turns on the credibility of the proponent of the strike and will
not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous."3
Preservation: This issue was preserved at R. 101 [25-28].

RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
The following provision from the United States Constitution is relevant on appeal.
The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in pertinent part:
. . . No State shall. . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.

2

State v. Pharris, 846 P.2d 454,459 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). See also Batson v. Kentucky.
476 U.S. 79, 96 (1986) (describing the legal standards for assessing a prima facie case); State v.
Span. 819 P.2d 329, 340-42 (Utah 1991) (analyzing the legal cognizability of a minority group
for purposes of assessing a prima facie case of racial discrimination).
3

State v. Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996). See also State v. Bowman, 945
P.2d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (The trial court's determination about whether purposeful
racial discrimination has been proved "is a question of fact, [and] we will not reverse the
decision of the trial court unless it is clearly erroneous.")
2

U.S. Const, amend. XIV.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On 16 June 2000 Appellant Jeffery Ray Chatwin ["Mr. Chatwin"] was charged by
information with one count of Aggravated Assault, a third degree felony, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). Mr. Chatwin entered a plea of not guilty, R. 21, and
a trial date was set. R. 33.
A venire was assembled on 21 November 2000.4 Following voir dire, the
prosecutor and defense counsel exercised their peremptory strikes. R. 49,101 [23]. The
prosecutor used one of his strikes to eliminate the only member of a minority group, Mr.
Romero, from the venire. R. 49,101 [25-27]. Also, all four of the prosecutor's strikes
were used to eliminate men. R. 49, 101 [27]. The defense counsel challenged the
elimination of Mr. Romero, pointing out that he was the only member of a minority
group on the venire. R. 101 [26]. The prosecutor replied that he was not required to
proffer an explanation for the strike unless the court found a prima facie case of racial
discrimination. Id
The court found that the name "Romero" is a Hispanic surname, and that the
defense counsel was entitled to an explanation for the strike. R. 101 [26-27]. The
prosecutor stated the following:
I felt, Your Honor, that this Jury would be better able to deliberate the
4

R. 101 [4-5]. The Jury List, R. 49-50, is included in Addendum B.
3

evidence that I anticipate presenting to it if it were balanced between men
and women. I therefore made efforts to take men off of the Jury. That may
not make a great deal of sense, but that was the game plan. Mr. Romero
was a man, I took him because he was a man and I thought I would be more
comfortable with Ms. Rayburn or Ms. Tapp on the Jury than Mr. Romero
on the Jury.
R. 101 [27]. In response, the defense counsel pointed out that the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Batson v. Kentucky, prohibiting the use of peremptory strikes to
eliminate venirepersons on the basis of their race, is extended to prohibit gender
discrimination. R. 101 [28]. The defense counsel argued that removing venirepersons on
the basis of either race or gender is inappropriate. Id. The trial court responded as
follows:
Well, I am not prepared to state that the [prosecutor's] challenge [of Mr.
Romero] was inappropriate. It appears to me that there's been a justification
for exercising the challenge against Mr. Romero. And moreover I'm not
persuaded that in a case of this nature, specifically a spousal-abuse type of
case, that selecting jurors, be they male or female which the Prosecutor or
Defense for that matter decides might be more inclined to adhere to the
Prosecution's theory of the case or the Defense's theory, for instance, that
that was an inappropriate way or manner or justification for a challenge;
therefore, your challenge is declined.5
Mr. Chatwin was convicted by the jury as charged. R. 41-42. He filed a timely
Notice of Appeal. R. 85-86.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Based upon incidents of domestic violence, Judge Sheila McCleve issued a
5

Id The transcript of the defense counsel's objection, the prosecutor's explanation, and
the trial court's rulings, R. 101 [25-29], is included in Addendum C.
4

protective order against Ms. Brenda Lee ["Ms. Lee"], ordering her to attend counseling
and anger management classes and to stay away from Mr. Chatwin. R. 101 [55-56]. In
violation of that order, Ms. Lee was living with Mr. Chatwin, his mother, and his five
daughters at 1325 Indiana Avenue. R. 101 [37].
On 13 June 2000 Ms. Lee was intoxicated. R. 101 [52]. She had been drinking and
using methamphetamine. R. 101 [39-40, 52-53]. She drove from Mr. Chatwin's house to
her friend "Doug's" house, using Mr. Chatwin's vehicle. Id. She then returned to Mr.
Chatwin's house. R. 101 [40]. She and Mr. Chatwin, who had drunk some beers that day,
began arguing because Ms. Lee had missed a Drug Court meeting which she had been
ordered to attend. R. 101 [40-41, 54-55]. Ms. Lee decided to leave and go to her mother's
house. R. 101 [41]. She began walking west on Indiana Avenue. Id
Ms. Lee testified that Mr. Chatwin was "hollering and screaming" at her as she
walked. R. 101 [43], However, a juvenile witness indicated that Mr. Chatwin "just
standed there." R. 101 [63]. Besides being intoxicated, Ms. Lee had not slept for at least a
day due to her methamphetamine use. R. 101 [52-54].
About that time, Ms. Lee's 14-year old daughter, Alicia Ann Lee ["Alicia"],
telephoned Mr. Chatwin's home because she hadn't spoken to her mother in several days
and wanted to see how her mother was doing.6 Mr. Chatwin answered the telephone. R.
101 [104]. He told Alicia that her mother was outside, and that she was taking her things
and wanted to leave. Id Ms. Lee did not come to the telephone. R. 101 [101].
6

R. 30,101 [99]. Alicia was not living with her mother at that time. R. 101 [100].
5

Ms. Lee continued walking west on Indiana Avenue. She crossed Concord Street
and Navajo Street, and reached a 7-Eleven. R. 101 [42-43]. Mr. Chatwin got in his truck
and drove west, intending to find Ms. Lee to tell her about Alicia's call. R. 101 [43, 87].
He turned into the 7-Eleven and stopped in front of Ms. Lee. R. 101 [44]. He asked her to
get in the truck. R. 101 [44]. She refused. R. 101 [45]. She turned, walked behind the
truck, and started walking across the street. Id. A juvenile witness testified that Mr.
Chatwin put the truck in reverse and hit Ms. Lee, throwing her several feet. The witness
testified that Mr. Chatwin said, "that's what she gets." R. 101 [69]. Mr. Chatwin left the
scene. R. 101 [71].
After Mr. Chatwin returned home, he called the police and reported that a drunk
woman had bumped into his car at the 7-Eleven. R. 101 [80]. Alicia called again and Mr.
Chatwin answered. R. 101 [104]. He told Alicia that her mother had bumped into the
back of his truck and was at the 7-Eleven acting "like he hit her with the truck." Id. He
also told Alicia "that he didn't know what he supposed to do" and had simply returned to
the house. R. 101 [104].

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The prosecutor's blatant admission that he "made efforts to take men off of the
Jury," R. 101 [27], and that he dismissed Mr. Romero from the jury because Mr. Romero
was a man, Id., violates the Equal Protection principle. In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the United

6

States Supreme Court extended the holding of Batson v. Kentucky7 to prohibit
prosecutors from intentionally discriminating against potential jurors on the basis of their
gender. J.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S. 127,130-31 (1994). As the Court explained in
JJEJL intentional discrimination on the basis of gender "serves to ratify and perpetuate
invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about the relative abilities of men and
women." Id. This is particularly true in cases which involve gender-related issues, such
as rape, sexual harassment, or paternity. IdL at 140. Courts across the country have been
particularly diligent in ridding domestic violence cases from the taint of gender
discrimination during jury selection.8
This case involves an incident of domestic violence and the trial court should have
been particularly diligent in ensuring that gender discrimination did not taint jury
selection. Instead, the trial court allowed the prosecutor to dismiss Mr. Romero on the
basis that the prosecutor's "game plan" was to remove men from the jury and Mr.
Romero was dismissed pursuant to this plan. R. 101 [27]. The trial court also ruled that
racial discrimination had not occurred and that gender discrimination during a "spousalabuse type case" was not inappropriate. R. 101 [28].

7

In Batson v. Kentucky the United States Supreme Court held that prosecutors may not
intentionally discriminate against potential jurors on the basis of their race. Batson v. Kentucky,
476 U.S. 69, 89 (1986).
8

Maddox v. State, 708 So.2d 220, 228 (Ala. Crim. App. 1997); State v. Bourgeois. 786
So.2d 771, 775 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Commonwealth v. Tourscher. 682 A.2d 1275, 1280 (Pa.
1996); State v. Turner. 879 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tenn. 1994); State v. Donaghv. 769 A.2d 10,1415 (Vt. 2000); Pavne v. Gundy. 468 S.E.2d 335, 340, 343 (W. Va. 1996).
7

This ruling defies the holding of the United States Supreme Court in J.E.B. v.
Alabama, and ignores the recognition of the Utah Supreme Court and this Court that
gender discrimination is unconstitutional. State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f23 n.9, 12
P.3d 92; State v. ColwelL 2000 UT 8,114,994 P.2d 177; State v. Shepherd. 1999 UT
App 305, TJ28, 989 P.2d 503. It also sets a dangerous precedent that would allow
prosecutors to unabashedly discriminate on the basis of gender simply by asserting that
members of one gender are more likely to be sympathetic and receptive to prosecutorial
arguments. This sort of stereotyping is at the root of the social injustice condemned by
the United States Supreme Court in Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 97-99 and J.E.B. v.
Alabama, 511 U.S. at 131-34. As the Court said in J.E.B.. "[s]triking individual jurors on
the assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their gender is
'practically a brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.'" IcL
at 142 (citations omitted). The trial court's unconstitutional precedent should be
condemned by this Court, and Mr. Chatwin should receive a new trial untainted by
governmentally-approved racial or sexual discrimination.

ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ALLOWING THE PROSECUTOR
TO STRIKE THE ONLY MINORITY VENIREPERSON AFTER
THE PROSECUTOR EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS DOING SO ON
THE BASIS OF THE VENIREPERSON'S GENDER
The principal of Equal Protection prohibits the prosecutor from using even one

8

peremptory challenge to discriminate against a venireperson on the basis of race or
gender. Yet, in this case the prosecutor boldly declared, "Mr. Romero was a man, I took
him [off] because he was a man and I thought I would be more comfortable with Ms.
Rayburn or Ms. Tapp on the Jury than Mr. Romero on the Jury." R. 101 [27]. The trial
court, seemingly reassured that no unconstitutional activity was taking place, permitted
the strike, ruling that there was nothing inappropriate about gender discrimination in a
"spousal-abuse type of case . . . . " R. 101 [28]. This blatantly ignores well-established
jurisprudence flatly prohibiting race or gender-based discrimination injury selection, and
condones gender discrimination in precisely the circumstances where it may do the most
harm.
Beginning with Batson v. Kentucky issued in 1986, the United States Supreme
Court has worked to ensure that the jury selection process proceeds unhindered by the
evils of social discrimination that undermined the fabric of our society in the past. In
Batson the Court declared that "the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to
challenge potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black
jurors as a group will be unable impartially to consider the State's case against a black
defendant." Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 89 (1986). This protection was readily
extended to members of all cognizable racial minority groups in Holland v. Illinois. 493
U.S. 474,476-77 (1990).
In J.E.B. v. Alabama, the Court examined the issue of gender discrimination in the
jury selection process. In J.E.B. the State of Alabamafileda paternity suit against a man
9

on behalf of a mother and her minor child. J.E.B. v. Alabama. 511 U.S. 127, 129 (1994).
The venire consisted of thirty-six people, twelve men and twenty-four women. Id The
State used nine of its ten peremptory strikes to remove men and the defendant used all
but one of his strikes to remove women. Id. The resulting jury consisted entirely of
women. Id. The defendant was found to be the father of the child and was ordered to pay
child support. Id He appealed, claiming that the prosecutor unconstitutionally
discriminated against men in exercising his peremptory challenges. Id. at 129-30.
The United States Supreme Court agreed. The Court declared:
[t]oday we reaffirm what, by now, should be axiomatic: Intentional
discrimination on the basis of gender by state actors violates the Equal
Protection Clause, particularly where, as here, the discrimination serves to
ratify and perpetuate invidious, archaic, and overbroad stereotypes about
the relative abilities of men and women.
Id. at 130-31. Attempting to justify the strikes, the State drew the Court's attention to the
fact that the case involved a paternity action filed on behalf of a child born out of
wedlock. Id. at 137-38. The State argued that it was reasonable to strike virtually all of
the men from the jury because, historically, male jurors had been disposed to accept the
arguments of a man while female jurors were disposed to accept the arguments of the
mother. Id The Court flatly rejected this argument, declaring, "[w]e shall not accept as a
defense to gender-based peremptory challenges 'the very stereotype the law condemns.'"
Id at 138 (citation omitted). The Court emphasized:
When state actors exercise peremptory challenges in reliance on gender
stereotypes, they ratify and reinforce prejudicial views of the relative
abilities of men and women. Because these stereotypes have wreaked
10

injustice in so many other spheres of our country's public life, active
discrimination by litigants on the basis of gender during jury selection
invites cynicism respecting the jury's neutrality and its obligation to
adhere to the law.' . . . The potential for cynicism is particularly acute in
cases where gender-related issues are prominent, such as cases involving
rape, sexual harassment, or paternity. Discriminatory use of peremptory
challenges may create the impression that the judicial system has
acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one gender or that the 'deck
has been stacked' in favor of one side.9
Addressing concern that its holding would severely cripple the important role of
peremptory challenges in impaneling fair, impartial juries, the Court added that its
holding "does not imply the elimination of all peremptory challenges." IdL at 143. On the
contrary, "[p]arties still may remove jurors who they feel might be less acceptable than
others on the panel; gender simply may not serve as a proxy for bias." Id. "Even strikes
based on characteristics that are disproportionately associated with one gender could be
appropriate, absent a showing of pretext." Id. To avoid pretextual strikes, trial courts
9

IcL at 140 (emphasis added) (quoting Powers v. Ohio. 499 U.S. 400,412-13 (1991)).
Significantly, the Court also noted:
Even if a measure of truth can be found in some of the gender stereotypes used to
justify gender-based peremptory challenges, that fact alone cannot support
discrimination on the basis of gender injury selection. We have made abundantly
clear in past cases that gender classifications that rest on impermissible
stereotypes violate the Equal Protection Clause, even when some statistical
support can be conjured up for the generalization
The generalization
advanced by Alabama in support of its asserted right to discriminate on the basis
of gender is, at the least, overbroad, and serves only to perpetuate the same
'outmoded notions of the relative capabilities of men and women.' . . . The Equal
Protection Clause, as interpreted by decisions of this Court, acknowledges that a
shred of truth may be contained in some stereotypes, but requires that state actors
look beyond the surface before making judgments about people that are likely to
stigmatize as well as to perpetuate historical patterns of discrimination.
Id at 139 n.l 1 (citations deleted).
11

should conduct a thorough voir dire so that parties will have afirmbasis upon which to
exercise their peremptory strikes. Id. at 143-44. "If conducted properly, voir dire can
inform litigants about potential jurors, making reliance upon stereotypical and pejorative
notions about a particular gender or race both unnecessary and unwise." Id at 143.
The Utah Supreme Court recently recognized that J.E.B. v. Alabama prohibits
Utah prosecutors from purposefully discriminating against venirepersons on the basis of
their gender. State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76,1J23 n.9, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Colwell. 2000
UT 8, fl4, 994 P.2d 177. Likewise, this Court holds that striking potential jurors solely
on the basis of their gender violates the principal of Equal Protection. State v. Shepherd.
1999 UT App 305, ^28, 989 P.2d 503.
As a result of J.E.B.. courts across the country are particularly diligent in
scrutinizing jury selection proceedings when cases involve domestic violence, rape,
sexual harassment, and other gender-sensitive issues.10 Recently, appellate courts have
reversed or remanded many cases involving domestic violence because prosecutors have
blatantly discriminated against venirepersons on the basis of gender." Even when gender

See J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 140 ("The potential for cynicism is particularly acute in cases
where gender-related issues are prominent, such as cases involving rape, sexual harassment, or
paternity. Discriminatory use of peremptory challenges may create the impression that the
judicial system has acquiesced in suppressing full participation by one gender or that the 'deck
has been stacked' in favor of one side.")
11

Maddox v. State. 708 So.2d 220, 228 (Ala.Ct. App. 1997); State v. Bourgeois. 786 S.2d
771, 775 (La. Ct. App. 2001); Commonwealth v. Tourscher. 682 A.2d 1275,1280 (Pa. 1996);
State v. Turner. 879 S.W.2d 819,821 (Term. 1994).
12

discrimination is merely implied, courts have reversed or remanded for Batson hearings.12
In such cases, a showing of harmfulness is not required because gender or racebased discrimination is a structural error that affects the entire trial from beginning to
end. State v. Russell 917 P.2d 557, 560 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This is consistent with
Batson v. Kentucky, which indicated that a showing of purposeful racial discrimination,
unrebutted by a race-neutral explanation, requires the reversal of the defendant's
conviction.13 In this case, the prosecutor removed Mr. Romero from the jury on the basis
of his gender and race, and Mr. Chatwin's conviction should be reversed and this case
remanded for a new trial.

A. As the Trial Court Ruled. There is a Prima Facie Case of Racial
Discrimination Because Mr. Romero was the Only Member of a Racial
Minority Group on the Venire. He Spoke with an Accent and There was no
Indication that He was an Incompetent or Undesirable Juror
The United States Supreme Court indicates that when a peremptory strike is
challenged as a pretext for racial or sexual discrimination, a three-part test applies. J.E.EL
511 U.S. at 144-45; Batson. 476 U.S. at 96-99. First, a defendant who is alleging
discrimination must proffer a prima facie showing of intentional discrimination. J.E.B..

12

People v. Gandv. 878 P.2d 68, 70 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996); State v. Donaghv. 769 A.2d
10,14-16 (Vt. 2000); Pavne v. Gundv. 468 S.E.2d 335, 340, 343 (W. Va. 1996).
13

Batson, 476 U.S. at 100. See also State v. Pharris. 846 P.2d 454,459 (Utah Ct. App.
1993) (Parties stipulation that a showing of harm is not required where purposeful discrimination
is shown is "consistent with the directive in Batson that if a courtfindsunrebutted, purposeful
discrimination, 'precedents require that [a] petitioner's conviction be reversed."')
13

511 U.S. at 144-45. "In Utah, the elements necessary to establish a prima facie case
include: '(1) as complete a record as possible, (2) a showing that persons excluded belong
to a cognizable group . . . and (3) a showing that there exists 4a strong likelihood that
such persons are being challenged because of their group association rather than because
of any specific bias.' 5 " 14
Once a prima facie showing has been proffered, "[t]he burden then shifts to the
challenged party to show the existence of a [race or gender] neutral reason for the
challenge." State v. Cantu. 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989). If the prosecutor's
explanation is race neutral and gender neutral, the trial court must proceed to determine
whether purposeful racial or sexual discrimination has tainted the jury selection process.
Pharris, 846 P.2d at 464. If the prosecutor's explanation is discriminatory on its face, the
challenged peremptory strike violates the Equal Protection principal and the trial court
must disallow the strike as a matter of law.15
14

Shepherd, 1999 UT App 305,1J29, 989 P.2d 503 (quoting State v. Alvarez. 872 P.2d
450,456 (Utah 1994)).
15

See Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 ("The prosecutor therefore must articulate a neutral
explanation related to the particular case to be tried. The trial court then will have the duty to
determine if the defendant has established purposeful discrimination.") (emphasis added); State
v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153,155-56 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Once a race neutral explanation is
proffered, the trial court must determine whether the explanation is a pretext for racial
discrimination. This determination rests on the credibility of the proponent of the strike, and this
Court "will not reverse the decision of the trial court unless it is clearly erroneous."); State v.
Higginbotham, 917 P.2d 545, 548 (Utah 1996) (Because the final step requires the trial court to
evaluate the credibility of the proponent of the strike, who has already proffered a race neutral
explanation, the court's determination "will not be set aside unless it is clearly erroneous.");
State v. Merrill 928 P.2d 401,403 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) ("'[U]nless a discriminatory intent is
inherent in the prosecutor's explanation, the reason offered will be deemed race neutral.'...
[When the explanation is race neutral] the inquiry, as to whether Batson was violated, proceeds
14

In this case, the first part of the test is met. As the trial court ruled, there is a prima
facie case of racial discrimination. R. 101 [27]. The prosecutor used his fourth
peremptory challenge to dismiss Mr. Romero. R. 49. Mr. Romero spoke with an accent,
R. 101 [28], and the trial court noted that Mr. Romero had a Hispanic surname. R. 101
[27]. Both the defense counsel and prosecutor acknowledged that Mr. Romero was a
minority venireperson. R. 101 [26-27]. In fact, as the defense counsel pointed out, Mr.
Romero was the only member of a racial minority group on the venire. R. 101 [26].
Further, there was no apparent reason for Mr. Romero's dismissal. During voir dire, he
stated his name, indicated that he worked for Associated Food stores, and explained that
his wife worked for Sky West. R. 101 [7]. He said nothing during the rest of voir dire, R.
101 [11-24], and there was nothing to indicate that he was an incompetent or undesirable
juror from the prosecutor's point of view. In these circumstances, the trial court correctly
found that there was a prima facie showing of racial discrimination. R. 101 [27].
The defense counsel did not have an opportunity to proffer a prima facie case of
sexual discrimination because that issue did not arise until the prosecutor gave an
explanation which was sexually discriminatory on its face. R. 101 [27]. The trial court
then ruled on both issues of discrimination. R. 101 [28]. At this point, the issue of
whether there was a prima facie case of sexual discrimination is moot. Once a prosecutor
tenders his explanation and the trial court rules on the ultimate question of purposeful
to step three.") (citations omitted).
15

discrimination, the preliminary issue of a prima facie showing is irrelevant.16
At any rate, there was a prima facie case of sexual discrimination here. The venire
consisted of thirty people, nineteen men and eleven women. R. 49-50. The first seventeen
names on the list included ten men and seven women.17 The prosecutor used 100 percent
of his strikes to eliminate men. Four men were struck by the prosecutor, three men and
one woman were struck by the defense counsel, and one woman was excused by the

16

Hernandez v. New York. 500 U.S. 352, 359 (1991). See also Drane v. State. 523
S.E.2d 301, 303 n.3 (Ga. 1999) ("The trial court made no finding as to prima facie
discrimination, but this preliminary finding is moot once the proponent gives reasons for its
strikes and the trial court makes its findings."); People v. Rivera, 719 N.E.2d 154, 162 (111. Ct.
App. 1999) ("[T]he preliminary issue of whether the defendant has made a prima facie case
becomes moot where the trial court fails to determine whether such a showing has been made,
the State voluntarily offers reasons for its challenges, and the trial court rules on the ultimate
question of purposeful racial discrimination."); State v. Edwards, 955 P.2d 1276, 1288 (Kan.
1998) ("[0]nce a prosecutor has offered a race-neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges
and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional discrimination, the
preliminary issue of whether the defendant has made a prima facie showing becomes moot.");
Collins v. State. 691 So.2d 918, 926 n.3 (Miss. 1997) ("Once a prosecutor has offered a raceneutral explanation for the peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate
question of intentional discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant had made
a prima facie showing becomes moot."); Fritz v. State. 946 S.W.2d 844, 850 n.2 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1997) ("Once the responding party has offered a neutral explanation for the peremptory
challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of purposeful discrimination, the
preliminary issue of whether the objecting party had made a prima facie showing becomes
moot."); Colwell 2000 UT 8, fl8 (the requirement of a prima facie showing is waived when the
prosecutor fails to contest the sufficiency of the showing and proffers an explanation); Bowman,
945 P.2d at 155 n.2 ("The prosecutor waived the issue of whether a prima facie case of
discrimination was established by failing to raise it in the trial court and providing an
explanation for his use of the challenged peremptory strikes."); State v. King, 572 N.W.2d 530,
533 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997) ("When the prosecutor offers a race-neutral explanation for
peremptory challenges and the trial court has ruled on the ultimate question of intentional
discrimination, the preliminary issue of whether the defendant made a prima facie showing
becomes moot.").
17

R. 49. Only thefirstseventeen venirepersons were necessarily evaluated by counsel for
each side because eight jurors were to be impaneled, eight would be dismissed through
peremptory strikes, and one was excused by the court. R. 49.
16

court. R. 49-50. Ultimately, the jury consisted of five women and only three men. R. 49.
By using his strikes to systematically eliminate men, the prosecutor reduced the
percentage of men from sixty-three percent on the venire to thirty-eight percent on the
jury.18 Further, the alleged victim in this case was a women and the defendant was a man.
These facts alone provides a strong indication of gender discrimination.19 Additionally,
the fact that this was a domestic violence case should have triggered careful
scrutinization of the jury selection process because this is precisely the type of case where
"[t]he potential for cynicism is particularly acute."20 Thus, there was a prima facie case of
18

R. 49. The percentage of men making up the first seventeen names listed is fifty-nine

percent.
19

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97 (pattern of striking members of cognizable racial group may
give rise to inference of discrimination); Maddox, 708 So.2d at 224 (prima facie case established
where prosecutor used nine of his eleven peremptory challenges to strike men); Gandy, 878 P.2d
at 69 (prima facie case established where venire consisted of eleven men and fourteen women,
and prosecutor used all six of his peremptory challenges to strike men); Bourgeois, 786 So.2d at
776 (prima facie case established where prosecutor exhibited a pattern of striking men from the
jury where "[n]o obvious reason for the strikes other than gender appear of record."); State v.
Call 508 S.E.2d 496, 510 (N.C. 1998) (Factors to consider in evaluating whether a prima facie
case has been established "include the gender of the defendant, the victim and any key
witnesses; questions and comments made by the prosecutor during jury selection which tend to
support or contradict an inference of gender discrimination; the frequent exercise of peremptory
challenges to prospective jurors of one gender that tends to establish a pattern, or the use of a
disproportionate number of peremptory challenges against venire members of one gender;
whether the State exercised all of its peremptory challenges; and the ultimate gender makeup of
the jury."); Pharris. 846 P.2d at 458 (this Court found a prima facie case of racial discrimination
where prosecutor used three of his four peremptory challenges to strike Native Americans);
Donaghy. 769 A.2d at 12 (prima facie case established where venire consisted often women and
eleven men, and prosecutor used six strikes to eliminate men and one strike to eliminate a
woman); Payne, 468 S.E.2d at 340 (prima facie case established where venire consisted of nine
men and three women, and prosecutor used two of his three peremptory strikes to eliminate
women).
20

J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 140. See also Donaghv. 769 A.2d at 14 ("Because this case involves
the gender-related issue of domestic violence, we review it with a keen eye to preventing state17

sexual discrimination here.

B. Because the Prosecutor's Explanation for the Dismissal was
Discriminatory on Its Face, the Trial Court Should Have Prohibited the
Strike at that Point Rather than Allowing the Strike on the Basis that Sexual
Discrimination is Acceptable in a "Spousal-abuse type case"
The second part of the three-part test requires the prosecutor to come forward with
a race and gender-neutral explanation for the dismissal. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 145. The
explanation "need not rise to the level of a 'for cause' challenge; rather, it merely must be
based on a juror characteristic other than gender [or race], and the proffered explanation
may not be pretextual." J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at 145. Specifically, "a party may not rebut the
prima facie case by either asserting that he or she believed that the challenged venireman
would be partial to the defendant because of race [or gender] or by simply denying any
lack of good faith in the challenged peremptory strikes."21 The explanation must be
legitimate in that it is race neutral and gender neutral, it must be related to the case being
tried, and it must be clear and reasonably specific. Cantu, 778 P.2d at 518.
In this case, after being required to proffer an explanation for Mr. Romero's
dismissal, the prosecutor responded:
I felt, Your Honor, that this Jury would be better able to deliberate the

sanctioned discrimination); Payne, 468 S.E. 2d at 343 ("inasmuch as this action involves a case
of alleged domestic assault and battery, it comports with the admonition of J.E.B., set forth
above, that the potential for cynicism in the face of gender discrimination in the jury selection
process 'is particularly acute in cases ... involving rape, sexual harassment, or paternity.'")
21

gharris, 846 P.2d at 463 (citing Batson. 476 U.S. at 98).
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evidence that I anticipate presenting to it if it were balanced between men
and women. I therefore made efforts to take men off of the Jury. That may
not make a great deal of sense, but that was the game plan. Mr. Romero
was a man, I took him because he was a man and I thought I would be more
comfortable with Ms. Rayburn or Ms. Tapp on the Jury than Mr. Romero
on the Jury.
R. 101 [27]. The court then asked the prosecutor whether the strike had anything to do
with Mr. Romero's Hispanic surname, and the prosecutor responded that it did not. Id.
The defense counsel again objected, explaining that the United States Supreme Court's
holding in Batson had been extended to prohibit gender discrimination. IdL at 28. The
trial court then ruled as follows:
Well, I am not prepared to state that the challenge was inappropriate. It
appears to me that there's been a justification for exercising the challenge
against Mr. Romero. And moreover I'm not persuaded that in a case of this
nature, specifically a spousal-abuse type of case, that selecting jurors, be
they male or female which the Prosecutor or Defense for that matter
decides might be more inclined to adhere to the Prosecution's theory of the
case or the Defense's theory, for instance, that that was an inappropriate
way or manner or justification for a challenge; therefore, your challenge is
declined. Let's bring the jury in.
Id at 28-29.
The prosecutor's explanation was discriminatory on its face, and the trial court's
ruling was legal error. The prosecutor blatantly admitted that his general game plan was
to remove men from the jury and he "made efforts to take men off of the jury." R. 101
[27]. He also acknowledged that he removed Mr. Romero "because he was a man
Id. This is illegal. "We shall not accept as a defense to gender-based peremptory
challenges 'the very stereotype the law condemns.'" J.E.EL 511 U.S. at 138 (citation

19

"

omitted). Thus, the trial court should have disallowed the peremptory challenge, and
should not have proceeded to the third part of the three-part test.
Blatant discrimination against venirepersons on the basis of gender, particularly
where the case involves domestic violence, has not been tolerated in light of J.E.B. In
Commonwealth v. Tourschen the Superior Court of Pennsylvania vacated a conviction
for burglary, criminal trespass, recklessly endangering another person, simple assault,
and terroristic threats because the prosecutor "blatantly stated that she struck six female
venirepersons because 'from prosecuting domestic cases [she has found] that women are
a lot tougher on domestic cases

'" Tourscher. 682 A.2d at 1277,1280 (citation

omitted). In a case of incest, the Louisiana Court of Appeals remanded for a Batson
hearing because the prosecutor commented before the trial and during the impanelment
that he was trying to keep men off the jury. Bourgeois. 786 So.2d at 775.
The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals reversed a rape conviction because the
prosecutor's explanation for removing a black woman from the jury was that "[t]here are
some authorities who believe that the fewer the women that you have on a rape case, the
.. as jurors, the better." Maddox. 708 So.2d at 228. In that case the Court commented,
"[t]his appears to be exactly the sort of gender-based reason for exercising peremptory
challenges condemned by the United States Supreme Court in J.E.B. v. Alabama

"

Id. Finally, in a case involving two counts of incest, the Supreme Court of Tennessee
affirmed the trial court's ruling that the defense counsel could not use his peremptory
strikes to eliminate women from the jury after he admitted that he was trying to empanel
20

an all-male jury. Turner. 879 S.W.2d at 821.
Mere implications of gender discrimination have compelled appellate courts to
reverse or remand for Batson hearings. The Supreme Court of Vermont remanded a case
for a Batson hearing because the prosecutor used 85 percent of his strikes against men.
Donaghy. 769 A.2d at 14-15. That Court noted that "[w]hen men appear to be
systematically removed from juries selected by a prosecutor [charged with prosecuting
violent crimes against women], there is a strong inference of gender discrimination." Id.
at 15. The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed an assault and battery conviction
because the prosecutor's explanation for using two of his three peremptory strikes to
eliminate women was cursory and ambiguous and appeared to be a pretext for gender
discrimination. Payne. 468 S.E.2d at 340. The Colorado Court of Appeals remanded a
case involving a conviction for burglary because the prosecutor dismissed six men from
the jury. Gandy, 878 P.2d at 69. The prosecutor in Gandy explained that he had
dismissed the men because his "profile for the ideal juror was, like the victim, an
educated professional woman who resided in the same neighborhood and in a similar
living situation/' IdL at 70. The Court was dissatisfied with this answer, and remanded for
further findings and rulings on the issue of gender discrimination. Id
Here, the prosecutor's blatantly discriminatory explanation did not meet the
second part of the three-part test. The prosecutor, apparently attempting to justify his
reasoning, indicated that "this Jury would be better able to deliberate the evidence that I
anticipate presenting to it if it were balanced between men and women." R. 101 [27].
21

However, the record shows that the prosecutor was not attempting to achieve an equal
balance of men and women on the jury. Although the first seventeen venirepersons
included ten men and seven women, the impaneled jury consisted offivewomen and
only three men. R. 49. The percentage of men was reduced fromfifty-ninepercent of the
first seventeen venirepersons to thirty-seven percent on the jury because of the
prosecutor's plan to deliberately remove as many men as possible from the jury. R. 49,
101 [27]. During the peremptory challenge exercise the defense counsel had also
eliminated some men, and if the prosecutor had intended to achieve an equal balance of
men and women he would have stopped eliminating men once the number of men and
women were equal.22 However, the prosecutor undauntedly continued eliminating only
men.
Further, achieving an equal balance of men and women on the jury is not a
legitimate goal. This goal is based upon the archaic and overbroad gender stereotypes
condemned in J.E.B.. and is inherently discriminatory in its nature. J.E.B.. 511 U.S. at
130-31. Thus, the prosecutor's comment indicating that he was trying to achieve a
balance of men and women on the jury is not bourne out in the record and is, itself, an

The peremptory strikes were exercised as follows: (1) prosecutor eliminated Mr. Paul
Nicolet, (2) defense counsel eliminated Mr. Kevin Leitch, (3) prosecutor eliminated Mr. Michael
Zarnofsky, (4) defense counsel eliminated Mr. Robert Cluff, (5) prosecutor eliminated Mr.Mark
Hanson, (6) defense counsel eliminated Ms. Rebel Wood (Ms. Wood is a woman, R. 101 [8]),
(7) prosecutor eliminated Mr. Romero, and (8) defense counsel eliminated Mr. David Cornelius.
R.49.
22

illegitimate explanation for Mr. Romero's dismissal 23

C. The Trial Court's Declaration that the Prosecutor's Blatant Sexual
Discrimination in a Spouse Abuse Case is not Inappropriate Sets a Dangerous
Precedent Which Wholly Defies the United States Supreme Court's Ruling in
J.E.B.. the Holding of this Court and the Holding of the Utah Supreme Court
Because the prosecutor's explanation was not racially and sexually neutral, the
trial court should have disallowed the strike immediately instead of proceeding to part
three of the three-part test.24 Notwithstanding, purposeful racial discrimination was
proven under the third part of the test. Part three requires the trial court to consider the
prosecutor's explanation in light of the surrounding circumstances, and decide whether
there was intentional discrimination. ColwelL 2000 UT 8, f20-24. In State v. Cantu. the
Utah Supreme Court indicated that:
the presence of one or more of [the following] factors will tend to show that
the state's reasons are not actually supported by the record or are an
impermissible pretext: (1) alleged group bias not shown to be shared by the
juror in question, (2) failure to examine the juror or perfunctory
examination, assuming neither the trial court nor opposing counsel had
questioned the juror, (3) singling the juror out for special questioning
designed to evoke a certain response, (4) the prosecutor's reason is
unrelated to the facts of the case, and (5) a challenge based on reasons

23

See ColwelL 2000 UT 8,1J22 ("We have previously held that a proponent's reason
given to justify a peremptory challenge must be (1) neutral, (2) related to the case being tried, (3)
clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate." (Internal quotations omitted)).
24

See Bowman. 945 P.2d at 155 ("If a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court
must then decide (step 3) whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful racial
discrimination.") (quoting Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 547).
23

equally applicable to juror[s] who were not challenged.25
Ultimately, the prosecutor's explanation must be "(1) [n]eutral, (2) related to the case
being tried, (3) clear and reasonably specific, and (4) legitimate." Cantu. 778 P.2d at 518.
Application of these criteria demonstrate that the prosecutor discriminated against
Mr. Romero on the basis of his race and gender. In explaining Mr. Romero's dismissal,
the prosecutor blatantly stated that he dismissed Mr. Romero "because he was a man . . . "
and implied that Mr. Romero had certain opinions and biases "because he was a man . . .
." R. 101 [27]. The prosecutor also indicated that he was trying to achieve a balance of
sexes on the jury, Id, and this is inherently discriminatory because it assigns certain
opinions, sympathies, and tendencies to people solely on the basis of their gender.
Further, the prosecutor used 100 percent of his strikes to eliminate men, R. 49, and then
explained to the court that his general game plan was to remove men from the jury. R.
101 [27].
There is no apparent reason to disbelieve the prosecutor's comments. Such
comments were against his own interests and were supported by his use of strikes. R. 49.
The prosecutor does not appear to have been kidding. R. 101 [27]. Further, the court did
not appear to disbelieve the comments, and in fact, acknowledged them and indicated
that it did not think that the prosecutor's game plan was inappropriate. R. 101 [28].
There is also a showing of racial discrimination which the court failed to examine

25

Cantu. 778 P.2d at 518-19. See also State v. Span. 819 P.2d 329, 342-43 (Utah 1991);
Bowman. 945 P.2d at 155-56; Pharos, 846 P.2d at 463-64.
24

properly, and which was the original motivation for the challenge. As the United States
Supreme Court explained in J.E.B.:
Because gender and race are overlapping categories, gender can be used as
a pretext for racial discrimination. Allowing parties to remove racial
minorities from the jury not because of their race, but because of their
gender, contravenes well-established equal protection principles and could
insulate effectively racial discrimination from judicial scrutiny.
J.E.EL 511 U.S. at 145. After the prosecutor tendered his sexually discriminatory
explanation, the trial court should have inquired further to determine whether the
prosecutor was using gender as a pretext for racial discrimination. However, the court did
not do this. The court did not ask the prosecutor why Mr. Romero was dismissed instead
of a different man.26 The court did not conduct further voir dire with Mr. Romero. R. 101
[27-28], The court did not even ask the prosecutor for further explanation.27 The entire
challenge, explanation, and ruling took only three pages, R. 101 [25-28], and resulted in
scant enlightenment beyond the prosecutor's indication that he was systematically
removing men from the venire. R. 101 [27]. In light of the fact that Mr. Romero was the
26

R. 101 [27-28]. Instead of dismissing Mr. Romero, the prosecutor could have
dismissed Brian Smith, Matthew Gregory, Robert Bennett, or David Cornelius. R. 49.
27

Id. The only question which the court asked was as follows:

THE COURT: So, the striking - - your peremptory challenge to Mr. Romero had nothing
- - according to your statement here, had nothing at all to do to the fact that he has an
Hispanic surname?
MR. COPE: Yes.
THE COURT: Very well.
Id at 27.
25

sole minority venireperson, the fact that nothing during voir dire indicated that Mr.
Romero was an incompetent or undesirable venireperson, and the prosecutor's sexually
discriminatory explanation, the trial court's ruling was clearly erroneous.28
Finally, the trial court's ruling that gender discrimination is not inappropriate in a
"spousal-abuse type of case," R. 101 [28], directly defies the holding of J.E.B. and its
jurisprudence. Under the trial court's precedent, prosecutors could unabashedly
discriminate on the basis of gender in any case simply by expressing the belief that one
gender as a group is more likely to be sympathetic to prosecutorial arguments. This raises
the specter of social injustice condemned in J.E.B.. which chronicled the exclusion of
women from jury service, property ownership, voting, and serving as legal guardians of
their own children from the time of English common law. J.E.B. 511 U.S. at 131-34. It
also "ratifies] and reinforc[es] prejudicial views of the relative abilities of men and
women," IdL at 140, which are often "'archaic and overbroad

'" Id. at 135 (citation

omitted). There is "virtually no support for the conclusion that gender alone is an
accurate predictor of juror's attitudes," Id at 139, and "[sjtriking individual jurors on the
assumption that they hold particular views simply because of their gender is 'practically a
brand upon them, affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.'" Id. at 142 (citation
omitted). The unconstitutional precedent set by the trial court should be unhesitatingly
28

There is no evidence to marshal in support of the trial court's determination of no
racial or gender-based discrimination. See ColwelL 2000 UT 8, ^[20 ("To show clear error, the
appellant must marshal all of the evidence in support of the trial court's finding and then
demonstrate that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is
insufficient to support the findings against an attack.") (quoting Higginbotham. 917 P.2d at 548).
26

quashed by this Court and replaced by a condemnation of gender discrimination during
jury selection.

CONCLUSION
In light of the above, Mr. Chatwin's conviction should be reversed, and this case
should be remanded for a new trial before a jury which court and counsel chose without
resorting to unconstitutional race or gender discrimination.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

I6U

day of January, 2002.
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ADDENDUM A

THIRD DISTRICT COURT-SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

MINUTES
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT

vs.

Case No: 001910582 FS

JEFFERY RAY CHATWIN,
Defendant.
Custody: Salt Lake County Jail

Judge:
Date:

J . DENNIS FREDERICK
J a n u a r y 5 , 2 001

6.0.*Hl$\H

ENTERS

PRESENT
Clerk:
cindyb
DATE
P r o s e c u t o r : BERNARDS-GOODMAN, KATHERINE
Defendant
Defendant's Attorney (s) : OCONNELL, JOHN D JR
DEFENDANT INFORMATION
Date of birth: August 4, 1964
Video
Tape Number:
1
Tape Count: 10:27-10:36
CHARGES
1 . AGGRAVATED ASSAULT - 3 r d Degree F e l o n y
Plea: Guilty
- D i s p o s i t i o n : 11/21/2000

{Guilty

Plea}

SENTENCE PRISON
B a s e d on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n of AGGRAVATED ASSAULT a 3 r d
D e g r e e F e l o n y , t h e d e f e n d a n t i s s e n t e n c e d t o an i n d e t e r m i n a t e t e r m
of n o t t o e x c e e d f i v e y e a r s i n t h e Utah S t a t e P r i s o n .
The p r i s o n t e r m i s s u s p e n d e d .

Criminal Sentence @J

Case No: 001910582
Date:
Jan 05, 2001
SENTENCE TRUST
The defendant is to pay the following:
Attorney Fees:
Amount: $250.00 Plus Interest
Pay in behalf of: LDA
Restitution:
SENTENCE TRUST NOTE
Pay restitution of all medical expenses of victim.
ORDER OF PROBATION
The defendant is placed on probation for 1 year(s).
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole.
Defendant is to pay a fine of 0
PROBATION CONDITIONS
Submit to searches of person and property upon the request of any
Law Enforcement Officer.
Do not use, consume or possess alcohol or illegal drugs, nor
associate with any people using, possessing or consuming alcohol or
illegal drugs.
Submit to tests of breath and urine upon the request of any Law
Enforcement Officer.
Enter, participate in, and complete any program, counseling, or
treatment as directed by the Department of Adult Probation and
Parole.
Submit to drug testing.
Not frequent any place where drugs are used, sold, or otherwise
distributed illegally.
Refrain from the use of alcoholic beverages.
Not to obtain any prescriptions without prior knowledge of
probation officer.
*Serve 60 days in the Salt Lake County Jail (ADC) in addition to
the time already served.
Upon release from jail, enter into and successfully complete
counseling program through F.A.C.T. or the Center for Family
Development as recommended by Adult Probcition and Parole.
No contact with victim Brenda Lee.

Case No: 001910582
Date:
Jan 05, 2001
Obtain and maintain full-time verifiable employment.
Pay recoupment fee and restitution as ordered within the probation
term.
*THE COURT ORDERS DEFENDANT BE COMMITTED FORTHWITH TO THE SALT LAKE
COUNTY JAIL (ADC) FOR 60 DAYS IN ADDITION TO THE TIME ALREADY
SERVED, AS A CONDITION OF PROBATION.*
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ADDENDUM C

(Jury sworn.)
THE COURT:

You may be seated for a moment, folks.

Will you please read the Information?
(Clerk reads Information.)
THE COURT:

Members of the Jury, I will remind you of

an admonition each time we reconvene or recess.

The

admonition is: Do not discuss this case with anyone. Do not
allow anyone to discuss it with you or in your presence. If
anyone attempts to do so, I want you to report it to myself or
the bailiff immediately.
You must not view, listen to, read or otherwise be
exposed to any media report about this trial.

I don't

anticipate there will be any, but you must be cautious about
that.

You must keep an open mind until you have heard all of

the evidence and not be distracted by any outside influences.
I will remind you of that admonition at each recess.
Now, we are going to take a recess, folks, of
approximately 15 minutes. And we will reconvene when the
Bailiff tells us itfs time.

Thank you, folks.

(Recess.)
THE COURT: We are convened in the instant matter
outside of the presence of the Jury.
Mr. Cope, Mr. O'Connell, you wanted to say something
on the record?
MR. O'CONNELL:

Your Honor, I had been concerned
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j about one of the Statef s challenges, and I wanted to put that
i on the record.

It was, I think, Number 11, Amador Romero.

! Mr. Romero was the only minority on the Jury, and I understand
!
!

I my client is not a minority, but I still think that hefs
entitled to the benefit — my client comes from a lower
socioeconomic environment, that Mr. Romero does not
necessarily come from that, but as a minority I think he has
more sympathy to that type of thing.

And so I think he's

still entitled to have him on this jury.
U.S. v, Battson (phonetic) —

And I think under

I forget the — under the

Supreme Court challenge, I am raising an objection to him
taking out the only minority at least in the first 17 we were
I picking from.

He was the only minority and was taken off by

the State.
THE COURT:

Mr. Cope, do you wish to state for the

record your rationale for exercising that peremptory thatf s
being referred to?
MR. COPE:

Your Honor, under Battson (phonetic) , my

understanding is that unless the Court finds that there was
some improper motivation or prima facia case was establish by
the Defense for that, that I will not have to state a reason
for striking Mr. Romero.

If the Court finds that Mr. Romero

was a minority, I believe —
|

I guess the Court could find

that.
But I note t h a t Mr. Romero was the fourth person
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taken by the prosecution, and that —

well, if the Court wants

me to state my reason for taking him rather than —
THE COURT:

Let me say it this way:

Of the initial

17 names from which the Jury was selected, at least as our
procedure goes, it appears to me that the name "Romero" is,
indeed, a Hispanic surname, and I think that given that fact,
alone, Counsel's probably entitled to some explanation as to
your reasons so I may then determine whether or not, in my
estimation, it was neutral and not racially charged so to
speak.
MR. COPE:

I felt, Your Honor, that this Jury would

be better able to deliberate the evidence that I anticipate
presenting to it if it were balanced between men and woman. I
therefore made efforts to take men off of the Jury-

That may

not make a great deal of sense, but that was the game plan.
Mr. Romero was a man, I took him because he was a man and I
thought I would be more comfortable with Ms. Rayburn or
Ms. Tapp on the Jury than Mr. Romero on the Jury.
THE COURT:

So, the striking — your peremptory

challenge to Mr. Romero had nothing —

according to your

statement here, had nothing at all to do to the fact that he
has an Hispanic surname?
MR. COPE:
THE COURT:

Yes.
Very w e l l .

MR. O'CONNELL:

Your Honor, i n r e s p o n s e t o t h a t :
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Briefly, I think Mr. Romero also had a little bit of an accent
as I recall

—

THE COURT: Excuse me?
MR. O'CONNELL:

Had a little bit of an accent, which

probably won't show up in the record since this is
transcribed.
My concern, of course, is —
name of the case.

I can't remember the

There was a later Supreme Court case that

extended Battson to gender as well, and it is also
inappropriate for the State to remove somebody solely based
upon their gender. And taking people off because they are
male or female I think is also inappropriate and in the same
situation as taking off a minority.

So I think either way

that it is an inappropriate choice.
THE COURT: Well, I am not prepared to state that the
challenge was inappropriate.

It appears to me that there's

been a justification for exercising the challenge against
Mr. Romero.

And moreover I' m not persuaded that in a case of

this nature, specifically a spousal-abuse type of case, that
selecting jurors, be they male or female which the Prosecutor
or Defense for that matter decides might be more inclined to
adhere to the Prosecution' s theory of the case or the
Defense's theory, for instance, that that was an inappropriate
way or manner or justification for a challenge; therefore,
your challenge is declined.
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Letf s bring the Jury in.
(Jury Present.).
THE COURT:

Jury is present, Counsel and the

Defendant are present.
You may present your opening statement, Mr. Cope.
MR. COPE: Thank you.
Mr. Chatwin, Mr. O'Connell, Your Honor, Ladies and
Gentlemen, this is a very simple case.
chronology.

It has a simple

It has a simple cast of witnesses.

There won't

be a great deal of doubt about what happened by the time the
evidence is finished.
The significance of what happened is what you are to
determine.

The Defendant sits there today protected by the

shroud or mantel of innocence that we all have as citizens,
especially when the sovereign state says:

"You did something

that's against the criminal law and we intend to try you for
it."
This all begins on the 13th of June; late in the
evening; certainly after 10:00 o1clock but before 11:00
o!clock.
The Defendant, Mr. Chatwin, and his girlfriend — I
think that's an appropriate term for her —
getting along.

She decided that she wanted to leave the

residence that they were sharing.
Indiana Avenue.

had not been

That place is at 1225 West

Anybody who knows Salt Lake City knows that
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